Trajectories of Violence against Ethnoreligious Minorities

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Abstract: How are popular violence and state violence against ethnoreligious minorities related? Insomuch as they might have similar political correlates, they are separate processes, of mobilization versus policy-making. Political mobilization theories connect popular violence to policy choices by policy-makers, predicting that popular violence precipitates state violence. Theories of political development interpret popular violence as an indication of state weakness, which should then mean that popular violence substitutes for state violence. The symbolic view of ethnoreligious difference poses that popular violence fulfills a ritual and boundary-maintaining function and is thus repeated without demand for or the occurrence of state violence. This paper compares antisemitic pogroms and expulsions in medieval Germany as expressions of popular violence and state violence. Analyses evidence an interaction between political mobilization and state capacity. Where the local state was strong, the state was more likely to respond to popular violence with state violence, and violence also escalated to the point of genocide more often. When incorporated into the government, religious organizational capacity to make violence a ritual limited state violence; when outside of the government, it facilitated state-led ethnoreligious cleansing. Any history of popular violence, whether proximate or not, conditions states to target ethnoreligious minorities with violence. State strength is no panacea for popular violence but in fact can facilitate group-targeted violence.

Keywords: group-targeted violence, mobilization, state capacity, religious organizations

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INTRODUCTION

Why does interethnic violence happen? Answering this question requires specifying who commits the violence; different perpetrators make for different theoretical implications. This paper focuses on two categories of violence, committed by different types of perpetrators: popular violence and state violence. Popular violence is targeted violence committed by popular actors, that is, by members of the general population. State violence is committed at the direction of the state and through the resources of the state. Instead of contrasting these two types of violence, this paper asks what the relationship between them is.

The three major strands of theories of interethnic violence propose different relationships between popular and state violence. The first sees violence as part of political mobilization (Enos, Kaufman, and Sands 2019; Kadivar and Ketchley 2018; Tilly 1978). In this tradition, popular violence communicates popular sentiment to state leaders, who respond with state violence. The second emphasizes the state's capacity for violence (Johnson and Koyama 2019; Mann 1986; Slater 2010): weak states can neither constrain popular violence nor enact state violence, so thus the two are inverse complements. Third, theories of violence as symbolic performance (Chandra 2012; Fujii 2021; van Klinken and Aung 2017) portray popular violence as almost ordinary, in that it does not demand escalation or state action at all. The predominant description as "interethnic" implies that violence is committed by multiple groups. In perhaps the majority of cases, however, this violence is not mutual; it is group-targeted by a majority group against a minority group. I use the latter term in the remainder of this paper.

I test these three possible relationships in the case of antisemitic violence in medieval German cities. Through repeated event multi-state survival analysis, I examine the temporal ordering of popular violence and state violence to detect the patterns implied by each theory.

Drawing on city histories of Jewish residency, antisemitic violence, and political and religious institutions as recorded in *Geschichte der Juden im Mittelalter von der Nordsee bis zu den Südalpen* [The History of the Jews in the Middle Ages from the North Sea to the Southern Alps] (Haverkamp 2002), I construct a dataset of spells of Jewish residency in cities, tracking the occurrence of popular violence, including genocidal pogroms and state violence operationalized as forced migration. With Bayesian multinomial logistic regression, I find support for all three theories connecting popular and state violence. In particular, I find that political mobilization interacted with state development: popular violence evoked the policy response of state violence contingent on state capacities. Additionally, the symbolic nature of interreligious violence made Jews regular victims, while genocidal pogroms were infrequent overall.

Scholarship on group-targeted violence has made clear that negative sentiments are not sufficient for violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Rydgren 2007). From its conception, this paper aligns with others who argue that "[p]olitics … explains the outbreaks of violence" (Kopstein 2021:219). Unlike other studies, this one does not proceed to examine balances of power between groups and the building blocks to instances of violence. Rather, pulling back to the broader arcs of interethnic relations provides a longer-term view of violence, something not currently addressed (Becker, Mukand, and Yotzov 2022). This has two advantages. First, it anchors more general conclusions about the risks for minority-targeted violence. Sequences of events under categorical conditions may be less precise measures than electoral outcomes or economic performance, but they are oftentimes more visible and more intuitive for both researchers and non-experts. Second, neither the context nor the theories as applied involve or require electoral politics or democracy. The methods and conclusions are more generalizable and reflect the reality that electoral politics are not always democratic,

especially in cases of minority oppression. Elections and democracy themselves are limited, in historical perspective and in considering the contexts of violence. Thus this study is broadly explanatory for the categories of violence it aims to represent.

In the next section, each of the three theories of group-targeted violence will be examined in more depth. I then pull out their distinct and interacting postulations. Next I review why survival analysis suits my purposes and introduce the construction of the dataset. I outline the results of my analysis. In the conclusion, I discuss the implications for studies of group-targeted violence.

THEORY

Insofar as they might have similar political correlates, popular violence and state violence are separate processes. Scholarship on group-targeted victimization and persecution often ignores this. For example, Grim and Finke (2007) do not distinguish different types of religious persecution as by different perpetrators. But violence by governments is not the same as violence by non-governments.

I address the relationship between popular violence and state violence by focusing on one key type of each: pogroms as popular violence and expulsions as state violence. Pogroms are incidents of ethnically-targeted violence by non-state actors, which can include relatively disorderly violence by neighbors as well as coordinated paramilitary-style attacks (Horowitz 2001; Kopstein 2021; Michlic 2007). They are not necessarily entirely grassroots, but the distinction is their potential for mass participation and the absence of state agents directed by state officials. Pogroms may be variously termed ethnic riots and intercommunal violence (Krause 2018; Tajima 2014; Varshney 2002). Expulsions are forced migrations enacted by legislation to relocate beyond borders, a group-level deportation as policy rather than judicial

determination (Garrity 2022; Henckaerts 1995; Kedar 1996). The destination is not important and not always legislated.

How are the ethnically-targeted violent actions of a population and of a government connected, if at all? Three families of theories, from different domains within social science, have bearing on this question. First, scholarship on state-society relations directs attention to interaction and responsiveness between society and government, and therefore to ethnic violence in terms of mobilization, political communication, and policymakers' incentives. Second, from a political development perspective, popular violence and state violence are dependent on state capacities and institutions. Third, symbolic interaction stresses the performance of violence, leading to a focus on ritual, the practice of social relations, social function, and what violence communicates to whom. I will apply each in turn to the question of how pogroms and expulsions might be related.

Political mobilization

For some scholars, asking how popular action and governmental action are related demands an answer rooted in political mobilization. This thread brings from broader theories of political conflict a focus on what violent collective action will impact or provoke. One set of mobilization outcomes is a change in public opinion and, correspondingly, public policy (Enos et al. 2019; Tilly 1978). State-society theories of government responsiveness interpret popular violence as the expression of popular sentiment, with the prediction that governments respond with policy shift that is also violent. Government elites, either because of political principles or because of incentives, are supposed to pay attention to collective action as a type of political communication.

Another type of mobilization outcome is electoral (van Klinken and Aung 2017; Toha 2021; Wilkinson 2006), or more broadly, for political control (Besley and Persson 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2009; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018). Popular violence can drum up co-ethnic voting or voting for co-ethnic patrons (Berenschot 2020). Popular violence is thus a fruit of political competition (Chamberlain and Yanus 2023; Kopstein 2021; Soule 1992). A mobilization approach is also reflected in any studies that investigate the opportunity structures of ethnic popular violence (Bara 2014; Barrie, Clarke, and Ketchley 2022; Elfversson et al. 2023) or speak of violence as part of a repertoire of contention (Luft 2015).

Across each of these specific mechanisms of mobilization, the expectation is that state violence is part of the same political quarrels and related to popular violence. In this family of theories, popular violence and state violence are not substitutes or complements, but sequentially co-occurring. In brief, political mobilization theories predict that pogroms precipitate expulsions.

State capacity

Other scholars concentrate on the state dimension of state violence. For this group of theorizers, the key question is how capable the state is. Some interpret popular violence as an indication of state weakness; the state is argued not to have the capacity to constrain violence among the population, and not to have a monopoly on violence (Jung and Cohen 2020; Mann 1986). Here, capacity concerns the organizational capital and legitimacy to use physical and symbolic ways to constrain violence or popular mobilization. One expression of this perspective is Gerring and Knutsen's (2022) explanation that institutional resolution of disputes is a substitute for interpersonal violence. In another variation, Beck, Tolnay, and Bailey (2016) argue that it was ambitions for strength that led some local governments to intervene against threatened lynchings in the US South.

But stronger states can and will use targeted violence, at times exactly because it cements their strength and helps them meet goals of governance. Balcells and Villamil (2020) demonstrate that the Francoist Spanish government persecuted minority teachers as part of a nationalizing project, but only after the Francoists had won the civil war. Johnson and Koyama (2019) make related claims, including that states balance their capacity to intervene with their interests in what popular violence might accomplish, and that states can expand their legitimacy, and consequently their capacity, by persecuting outgroups. Altogether, these various perspectives indicate that popular violence and state violence should have an inverse relationship, based on qualities of the state. Pogroms should occur in weak states but not strong states, and expulsions should occur in strong states but not weak states.

Performance and violent display

A third approach emphasizes the symbolic nature of ethnoreligious difference and, by extension, the symbolic work of violence to fulfill a ritual and boundary-maintaining function (Chandra 2012). While most studies of violence focus on its power to change circumstances, Fujii (2013, 2017, 2021) theorized violence as a performance, drawing attention to what is communicated and to whom. Of course there is some compatibility here with the argument that violence mobilizes and directs political leaders to take action, but Fujii's work is concerned with communication that is not aimed at action. This crops up in explanations of popular violence that spotlight the visibility of a group (Frey 2020; Solomon 2021). Popular violence like pogroms can communicate about a social order, such as reasserting an ethnic hierarchy (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011, 2018) that suppresses a minority group. Generally, then, popular violence as symbol and performance is marked by repetition without demand for or the occurrence of state violence, in opposition to both the mobilization and state capacity theories.

The performance of a social hierarchy needs a supply of ideas explaining that hierarchy as well as occasions to commence violence. Religious organizations and theocratic political groups organize and regularize violence into ritual (van Klinken and Aung 2017; Nirenberg 1996). If popular violence is ritualistic, then a pattern of ongoing pogroms should occur especially when and where religious organizations are more active, and, by the same coin, expulsions should not happen where religious organizations constrain violence into certain scripts.

Trajectories of violence

Each of these three implicates trajectories of violence, while not always directly invoking temporality. For example, the mobilization and responsiveness hypothesis provides a temporal trend of increasing violence until a state responds. Thinking in trajectories also helps us recognize the hidden counterfactuals to these theories, and therefore areas of distinctiveness. Taking again the mobilization theory, the two trajectories are (1) that a state responds to popular violence with new state violence, or else (2) popular violence ratchets to the extreme of genocide. Genocide is group-targeted mass killing (Harff 2003; Horowitz 2001; Krain 1997). It can be committed by popular actors (Luft 2015) or by a state (Fein 1979), but here I focus only on the former. We need to consider popularly-committed genocide as an alternative outcome and twin risk, with state violence, to minority groups. And here we can now distinguish between mobilizing popular violence and symbolic popular violence, as the latter should not reach the point of genocide.

In a temporal sense, there are five key trajectories identified by the three theories, distinguished by different terminal outcomes of group-targeted violence and different intervening popular violence. Of course, popular violence may not occur at all. In these settings, either there

is never group-targeted violence (A), or else, conditional on high state capacity, state violence occurs (B). The remaining set of trajectories concern settings where popular violence does occur. First, popular violence can be followed by genocide, which may or may not be conditional on state capacity (C). Second, popular violence can be followed by state violence, again potentially conditional on state capacity (D). Third, there may be no genocide or state violence, only recurrent popular violence (E). With these clarifications, we can now build hypotheses for how popular violence and state violence, pogroms and expulsions, are related.

CASE DETAILS AND SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES

I investigate pogroms and expulsions in the case of antisemitism in the medieval Holy Roman Empire. Jews lived in cities across the realm. Christians committed pogroms against Jews in many cities, sometimes genocidally,[1] and city governments occasionally expelled Jews by legislated forced migration. In historical records, some pogroms had clear causes, and others are more opaque. The same is true for the expulsions. While social scientists have been researching medieval European antisemitic violence for its connection to early state formation (Barkey and Katznelson 2011; Doten-Snitker 2021; Finley and Koyama 2018; Johnson and Koyama 2019), this case has not been used for more general exploration of different kinds of violence. There is a general presumption that past violence, or European antisemitic violence, are somehow self-evident, and therefore too distinctive to bear on modern violence. Recent work demonstrates the ignorance of both positions by using premodern violence and Christian

[1] Both "pogrom" and "genocide" were developed as concepts to describe antisemitic violence in the modern era. While some chafe at their projection into the premodern past, their social scientific definitions match medieval popular violence by Christians targeting Jews, including mass killing to the point of wiping out local populations.

violence against Jews to draw general conclusions (Braun 2019; Finley and Koyama 2018; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018; Lipton 2014; Malesevic 2017; Merback 2013). Like other targeted enthnoreligious groups and in other eras, Jews in medieval Germany were distinct yet undistinctive , at the mercy of others and yet possessing agency to build their own lives and advocate for their security (Aust 2018; Cluse 2009; Peters 2007; Toch 1995; Tuckwood 2010). More practically, the high sample size, through the great number of cities for which data is available, and the breadth of antisemitic violence across time and across cities make it a useful setting to consider trajectories of violence through time.

Taking this trajectory approach to the simultaneous risks of state violence and genocide, from the three theories of group-targeted violence I develop three hypotheses. First, if popular violence is a mobilization in search of a response from the government (Hausmann 2016), we should expect that pogroms will precede both genocide and expulsions (H1a, trajectories C and D). Relatedly, expulsion should happen sooner – Jewish co-residency should be shorter in cities where there were pogroms (H1b). This is the implication of mobilization and responsiveness: if there is a long lag between pogroms and expulsion, then it does not make sense to conceptualize expulsion as responding in any way to violent popular mobilization. In cities with consulting institutions, including representative institutions, government participants are theoretically more in touch with popular dynamics. Idealistically, consulting institutions make governments more responsive to the governed. Cities with these types of institutions should be most likely to have expulsions (H1c), if the popular violence-state violence link is via responsiveness.

Second, state capacity may determine whether there is popular or state violence. The expectation is that cities without institutional means of conflict resolution, and cities with weaker capacity more generally, will have pogroms and genocide without expulsions, whereas higher

capacity cities should have expulsions without pogroms (H2a, trajectories B and C). This theory also provides an extension of the mobilization hypothesis: pogroms will be interrupted by stronger states, who have the capacity to respond with expulsion (H2b, trajectory D) and who have the capacity to prevent the chaos of genocidal violence (H2c).

Third, if popular violence is symbolic, then we should expect that cities had regular antisemitic pogroms without expulsion or genocide (H3a, trajectory E). That is, pogroms were not aimed at state intervention and were not escalating, but instead occurred regularly to perform and reinforce the Christian-Jewish boundary, dependent, in a sense, on the continued presence of Jews. Religious organizations could coordinate Christians into the carnival of violence (Ladurie 1979), providing organizational capacity and the ideological foundations for the scripts of violence, including recognition of how far violence could go before it was unacceptable. They might also exert their influence to maintain Jewish communities, to facilitate their continued performance of religious beliefs. Religious organizational presence should have a protective effect from expulsion and genocide, too (H3b), even as it fostered pogroms.

METHODS

Typically, studies of group-targeted violence examine the risk of violence in a year or a month, conditional on contextual factors. The predictions above point to an analytical design in which polities are the units of analysis and the observations of these polities are structured in spells in which each unit is at risk of violence. Spells represent aggregated risk and put the focus on sequences across time, rather than the (low-level) risk in any given year. There are three possible outcome states for these spells: no violence, genocidal popular violence, or state violence. In brief, the data should be measured as multi-state, repeated events (Cortese and

Andersen 2010; Danieli and Abrahamowicz 2019). Because the theories implicate changing conditions over time, the data should also include time-dependent covariates.

I obtain data from *Geschichte der Juden von der Nordsee bis zu den Südalpen* (Haverkamp 2002), which records archival and historiographic information about cities where Jews lived, the Jewish communities themselves, and the timelines of Jewish residency during 1000-1520 CE in the western Holy Roman Empire, centered on the Rhineland. I arrange the data hierarchically into residency spells for each city (n=826), or the time period in which Jews were at risk of popular and state violence. Jews were not at risk of violence prior to their initial arrival in a city, nor after genocide or expulsion, but they would be at risk if they remigrated into a city. I can thus drop all years without Jewish residency and separate Jewish residency into spells (n=1276). I discard all spells after a second expulsion (10 spells across 6 cities) because these are extraordinary, leading to issues of sparseness when performing statistical comparisons. I measure the lengths of the spells in years, logged, which approximates a hazard function: any violence becomes cumulatively more likely the longer Jews are at risk of violence. Each city spell ends either without proximate violence[2], with a genocidal pogrom, or with an expulsion. Figure 1 illustrates residency spells in four cities.

[2] This is one form of right-censoring. The other, that the Jewish population in a city persists beyond the scope of the data collection, also occurs in a few cases.



Figure 1. Antisemitic popular violence and state violence during residency spells in four cities

Outcome states and trajectories

The classification of the spells into these different states and trajectories of violence is based on the measurement of pogroms and expulsions (Doten-Snitker 2021). A first possibility is that there is no recorded violence. The second is that popular violence – pogroms – occurred, but expulsion did not. Not all pogroms were genocidal, and thus if there are records of popular violence but not in the same year as the last year of a residency spell, then I consider this non-genocidal popular violence, which matches the symbolic theory of popular violence (H3a). If there is a pogrom recorded in the same year as Jewish residency ends, this is genocidal popular violence. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the outcomes by residency spell and within cities. In the analyses I include the sum of pogroms within a spell (H1a/H2a), to isolate the effect within that spell. I separately measure the total pogroms in prior spells, as popular violence in the same

residency spell should have a different accelerating relationship to state violence than popular violence in a prior residency spell. The final possibility is that state violence – expulsion – occurred, with (H1b) or without prior popular violence; expulsion always ended a residency spell.

Table 1. Popular violence and state violence within residency spells, n=1276

		Residency terminated without violence	Genocide	Expulsion
Pogrom(s)	No	775	210	67
	Yes	118	64	42

Table 2. Popular violence and state violence across cities, n=826

		Residency terminated without violence	Genocide	Expulsion	Both
Pogrom(s)	No	428	170	19	17
	Yes	83	55	24	30

State capacity

State capacity is theorized to relate popular and state violence via different mechanisms based on which domain of the state is invoked in definitions of "capacity." I create four different measures that capture the four predominant conceptualizations, but generally each evaluates the claim that state capacity enables expulsion and prevents pogroms (H2a). Descriptive statistics for all variables are in table 3. First, because of theory that popular violence is aimed at response by government, I isolate the *potential responsiveness* via consulting institutions that were designed for popular involvement (H1c): city councils and mayors, both of which were elected. Having recorded each of these as a binary, I sum the two values in each year and calculate the mean across each spell, ranging from 0 to 2.

The other three conceptions are more directly aimed at what types of state capacity facilitate the execution of expulsion (H2b) or prevention genocide (H2c). *Direct authority* grants a government more legitimacy and capacity to enforce its actions. I record whether a city is the residence of its governor or else a free city which had been granted complete self-governance. As with capacity for responsiveness, I tally these two and calculate the mean value across the years of each spell. *Legal capacity* provides dispute resolution and threatens punishment for individual-level violence. For this conception, I calculate the mean of annual tallies of whether a city had been granted the right of high justice (capacity and jurisdiction to try serious cases, including judgment of the death penalty) or had a college of *Schöffen*, a semi-representative body of locals who protected community peace and resolved conflicts. The final one, *administrative capacity*, concerns the development of agents, offices, and bureaucracy who can procure, distribute, and organize resources. This is the most traditional view of state capacity. I use the presence of an *Amt* and a *Schultheiss*, two types of administrative agents for governors who were appointed, not elected. Additionally, I add interaction terms between pogroms in spell and each of these four, as the hypotheses concern whether genocide and expulsion are preceded by pogroms, conditional on capacity.

Religious organization

In theorizing the ritualistic potential of popular violence, I hypothesized that religious organizational capacity would be associated with non-genocidal popular violence (H3b). I measure this in two dimensions. First, I calculate the mean annual count of episcopal authorities involved in city governance, labeling this *religious governance*. Second, I assess Christian function and capacity for religious display, as the proportion of a spell in which the city is the

seat of a diocese and the mean annual count of non-clergy religious communities (vowed and unvowed Catholic orders, e.g., monastic houses).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics, n = 1276

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Median	St. Dev.
Spell outcome	0	2	0.39	0	0.64
Pogroms, in spell	0	4	0.22	0	0.54
Pogroms, previous spell(s)	0	4	0.27	0	0.63
State capacity					
Potential responsiveness	0	2	0.25	0	0.49
Direct authority	0	1	0.16	0	0.35
Legal capacity	0	2	0.12	0	0.33
Administrative capacity	0	2	0.2	0	0.44
Religious organization					
Religious governance	0	1	0.29	0	0.44
Display: Diocesan seat	0	1	0.06	0	0.24
Display: Religious orders	0	31	0.53	0	1.69
Spell length (years)	1	378	58.88	50	53.14

Statistical procedure

Because of the data structure and multiple outcomes, I perform Bayesian multinomial logistic regression (Bürkner 2018) while drawing on the logic of multistate survival analysis and repeated events survival analysis. City random effects approximate individual frailty as often used in survival analysis. I do not control for spell number by city, assuming that the hazard of violence is consistent across residency spells except as through the effects of prior violence, which are be accounted for directly. For both intercepts (two alternative categories: genocide, expulsion), I set the prior as Student's half-t (Betancourt 2017; Gelman 2006; Gelman et al. 2008; Lemoine 2019; McElreath 2020), centered at 0 with sd=1. For all other model terms, I use Student's t priors centered on 0 with sd=2.5. I fit the model with 4 chains, each running through 1000 warmup and 4000 total iterations. There were no causes for alarm from the R-hats,

effective sample sizes, or divergent transitions. Model details, including leave-one-out cross-validation (Magnusson et al. 2019; Vehtari, Gelman, and Gabry 2017), can be found in the appendix.

RESULTS

Descriptively, expulsions and genocidal pogroms were more likely than not to be preceded by pogroms (H1a): 71 expulsions were preceded by pogroms, while 19 occurred in cities where there had not been any prior pogroms. Jewish residency was also cut short by pogroms (H1b). The mean and median spell length for spells with no violence (58.4 years, 50 years) are about 50% longer than the mean and median gap between a pogrom and a non-genocide spell end in spells where a single pogrom occurred (39.4 years, 33 years). The gap after a second pogrom in a spell drops further (mean: 20.9 years, median: 11 years). The multinomial regression results confirm that pogroms during a residency spell were associated with genocide or expulsion as a conclusion to Jewish residency. Table 4 displays the main results, with 89% credibility intervals (McElreath 2020), and table 5 holds the results when adding the interactions between pogroms and state capacities. In terms of magnitudes, the odds of genocide increase equally with the odds of expulsion as the number of pogroms increases. One result that deserves further future examination is that, while the odds of expulsion increase for both pogroms in a residency spell and prior pogroms, the odds of genocide decrease with pogroms in a prior period. This pattern follows from the fact that genocide only occurred in first or second residency periods. In later spells, Jews may have had more warning of, or been more able to flee, the possibility of genocide.

Moving on to the question of whether popular violence and state violence are part of a mobilization-response dynamic, I do not find evidence that cities with consulting institutions

were generically more likely to have expulsions, but that such cities were increasingly likely to have expulsions as the number of pogroms increased (H1c). The interaction with pogroms is positive for expulsions, as well as for genocide. These cities were more likely to be sensitive to and responsive to antisemitic popular violence, but they responded with state violence only as public pressure to do so increased. In contrast, direct authority did make state intervention more likely across the board, and not dependent on how many pogroms had occurred in a spell. When cities had more direct authority, expulsion was more likely (H2b); however, genocide was also more likely. Opposite of the expectation that the capacity to resolve conflict would have a negative relationship with genocidal popular violence, legal capacity was positively associated with genocide. Administrative capacity was related only to genocide, and only via the interaction with the number of pogroms in that spell.

Table 4. Bayesian multinomial regression results, n = 1242

	Model 1					
	Genocide			Expulsion		
	Estimate	89% CI		Estimate	89% CI	
Pogroms, in spell	1.02	0.76	1.31	1.11	0.74	1.51
Pogroms, previous spell(s)	-1.78	-2.53	-1.18	1.06	0.74	1.44
State capacity						
Potential responsiveness	0.03	-0.31	0.37	0.45	-0.02	0.95
Direct authority	0.63	0.20	1.06	1.66	1.11	2.27
Legal capacity	0.62	0.17	1.09	-0.14	-0.86	0.53
Administrative capacity	0.09	-0.26	0.46	0.16	-0.39	0.70
Religious organization						
Religious governance	0.21	-0.11	0.54	-0.63	-1.26	-0.05
Display: Diocesan seat	0.56	-0.14	1.25	1.51	0.62	2.48
Display: Religious orders	-0.12	-0.24	0.00	0.06	-0.04	0.18
Log spell length	-0.68	-0.83	-0.57	-0.23	-0.40	-0.06
Intercept	0.59	0.24	0.94	-3.24	-4.37	-2.36

On the matter of whether pogroms and expulsions substitute for each other, based on state capacity, there is no support across any of the four types of capacities (H2a). Pogroms interacted with state capacities do not have negative associations with either genocide or expulsion. In fact, none is negatively associated with genocide (H2c), but, as stated above, all four have positive associations with genocide either directly or via the interaction with pogroms. State capacities did matter for whether popular violence escalated to genocide or to state violence, but not entirely as hypothesized.

The third approach to group-targeted violence stresses its ritual and performativity. Though the regression results indicate that repeated pogroms during a residency spell increased the odds of genocidal popular violence and of expulsion, many cities had repeated antisemitic popular violence without genocide or state violence (H3a). Pogroms occurred during 13.2% of 893 spells without a violent end. In 83 cities, Christians committed non-genocidal pogroms but never genocidal pogroms or expulsion – 20.9% of cities that ever had antisemitic violence. The organizational capacity for religious ritual violence had mixed protective and facilitating effects for state violence but did not put a ceiling on how violent pogroms could become (H3b). On one hand, religious governance decreased the odds of expulsion. On the other hand, diocesan seats were more likely to expel Jews. Expulsion was a Christian ritual display of religious purification in its own right, so the positive relationship with diocesan seats fits with a very particular sense of expulsion as state violence that might not have been relevant in other cities. Neither religious governance nor Christian function were related to genocide.

Table 5. Bayesian multinomial regression results, with interaction terms, n = 1242

	Model 2					
	Genocide			Expulsion		
	Estimate	89% CI		Estimate	89% CI	
Pogroms, in spell	0.74	0.39	1.13	0.75	0.24	1.28
Pogroms, previous spell(s)	-1.96	-2.80	-1.28	1.13	0.80	1.52
State capacity						
Potential responsiveness	-0.02	-0.43	0.38	0.34	-0.19	0.89
Responsiveness * Pogroms	0.83	0.05	1.65	1.00	0.05	1.98
Direct authority	0.88	0.38	1.41	1.52	0.85	2.23
Direct * Pogroms	-0.88	-1.92	0.00	0.71	-0.14	1.58
Legal capacity	0.59	0.09	1.12	-0.10	-0.91	0.62
Legal * Pogroms	-0.06	-1.29	1.18	-0.51	-2.16	1.11
Administrative capacity	-0.19	-0.62	0.25	0.26	-0.35	0.84
Administrative * Pogroms	1.49	0.70	2.40	-0.38	-1.81	0.90
Religious organization						
Religious governance	0.16	-0.20	0.53	-0.61	-1.26	0.00
Display: Diocesan seat	0.71	-0.05	1.48	1.56	0.59	2.58
Display: Religious orders	-0.13	-0.27	-0.01	0.07	-0.04	0.19
Log spell length	-0.73	-0.91	-0.60	-0.23	-0.40	-0.05
Intercept	0.72	0.37	1.12	-3.49	-4.64	-2.53

A few data quality shortcomings affect the analyses. The data likely undercount popular violence and inflate the absence of violence. Jews might have fled a city if a pogrom seemed imminent, which is not a peaceful end to residency. If anything, the results should underestimate the connection between popular violence and state violence. It may miss some of the impact of state capacity, as Jews might have fled specifically where they assumed weaker governments would not protect them from genocide. Relatedly, there is limited operationalization of the theater of violence. The data misses low-level violence that did not rise to the level of pogroms, such as throwing stones at Jews; besides not being systematically recorded, such actions surely also were not recorded as frequently as they happened. Were such other data available,

presumably the regularity and performativity of antisemitic violence would be more clear, and perhaps there would be relationships with religious organization.

In spite of these shortcomings, the results are clearly in line with others that find states respond to ethnically-targeted popular violence with state violence. Scholars are accustomed by now to separating out different capacities of the state for a host of political economy outcomes; scholars should be more clear about how differing state capacities are implicated in their theories of interethnic discrimination and violence. Most commonly, because of interest in development of the rule of law, historical popular violence is framed as an issue of legal enforcement (Gerring and Knutsen 2022; Johnson and Koyama 2014). I find evidence counter to that. But more importantly, I test three other definitions of capacity common in political economy broadly but not applied to questions of historical violence. Varieties of capacity should be examined in other historical settings, as they already are in modern ones (Hendrix 2010), as their important doubtlessly changes over time.

The results here concerning state capacity have implications for ongoing debates about why different capacities developed and what they were useful for. Boucoyannis (2015, 2021) argued that consulting institutions were an encumbrance by strong states. Møller and Doucette (2022) disagree, explaining representation as fed by desires for local fidelity to Christian values, contrasted with a venal Catholic Church and collaborating political elites. The relationship I report between popular violence and consulting institutions favors the Møller and Doucette position; cities with more representative governments had more brutal ethnoreligious cleansing (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; Mann 2005). Likewise, one way of interpreting the relationship between legal capacity and genocide is that Christians committed extrajudicial

violence when they were accustomed to local judicial power. All in all, in the medieval era political development was dangerous to Jews.

Political economy entanglements

The core arguments and analysis of this paper side-step two factors long held to have impacted European state development. I rerun the main model specifications controlling for these two factors. First, commercialism was expanding during this period, feeding into the fiscal base for state development (Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994; Poggi 1978; Stasavage 2011) and upending social relations in ways that reorganized political institutions (Arteaga 2022; North and Weingast 1989; Puga and Trefler 2014; Wahl 2019). Commercial activities spurred the emergence of new merchant elites and the ascendence and proliferation of guildsmen (Ogilvie 2019, 2021), two sources of demand for consulting and legal institutions. Thus it may be consequential to control for commercial activity in a city when assessing the relationship between state capacity and the dual risks of expulsion and genocidal popular violence. From the same source as the other measures (Doten-Snitker 2021; Haverkamp 2002), I measure local commercial activity in the last year of a spell on an ordinal scale: no markets (0), one market or a generic record of market rights (1), multiple markets (2), any number of fairs (3) (mean = 0.59, sd = 0.86).

Second, Jewish communities were a resource for medieval governments. Primarily, Jews were a fiscal resource, contributing to taxable commercial activity, a source of coerced loans and expropriation, and occasionally participants in more substantial state finance (Botticini 2000; Burgard et al. 1996; Hagen 2018; Scholl 2015; Wenninger 1981, 2012). Because of limited surviving information about the size of Jewish communities, we do not know how size may have been related to state fiscal manipulation of Jews, but it is reasonable to assume that larger

communities lived under more developed governments. Larger Jewish populations may also have been more visible targets for violence (Solomon 2021). Ideally, the analyses should also control for the material value of Jews to Christian state-building and Jewish community size. Neither can be measured directly with the historical record. Instead, I use one variable that is related to both: a scale of the infrastructure built by the Jewish community. I simply tally, totaling from 0 to 4, whether there was a synagogue, cemetery, mikveh, and/or Jewish quarter in a city in the last year of a spell (mean = 0.45, sd = 0.87).

Table 6 displays key results for the additional specifications. The results are consistent with the main two specifications. Model comparison statistics from leave-one-out cross-validation indicate better fit when excluding these two added variables.

Table 6. Selected results with additional controls, n = 1240

	Model 3						Model 4					
	Genocide			Expulsion			Genocide			Expulsion		
	Estimate	89% CI		Estimate	89% CI		Estimate	89% CI		Estimate	89% CI	
Commercial development	0.03	-0.16	0.23	0.08	-0.19	0.35	0.02	-0.19	0.24	0.12	-0.17	0.39
Jewish community infrastructure	0.68	0.47	0.92	0.80	0.57	1.05	0.74	0.52	1.01	0.82	0.58	1.08
State capacity												
Potential responsiveness	-0.07	-0.45	0.29	0.27	-0.21	0.75	-0.11	-0.57	0.31	0.13	-0.40	0.67
Responsiveness * Pogroms							0.79	-0.04	1.63	1.01	0.05	1.98
Direct authority	0.49	0.03	0.96	1.42	0.86	2.04	0.78	0.25	1.33	1.24	0.56	1.94
Direct * Pogroms							-1.07	-2.16	-0.14	0.62	-0.20	1.50
Legal capacity	0.59	0.10	1.08	-0.19	-0.92	0.47	0.53	-0.03	1.11	-0.15	-0.98	0.57
Legal * Pogroms							-0.05	-1.35	1.21	-0.39	-1.97	1.18
Administrative capacity	0.06	-0.32	0.44	0.15	-0.42	0.69	-0.24	-0.70	0.21	0.24	-0.36	0.82
Administrative * Pogroms							1.55	0.68	2.54	-0.40	-1.82	0.90

CONCLUSION

This article calls for distinguishing between ethnically-targeted violence perpetrated by popular actors versus by governments. Instead of lumping these two different types of violence together, I explored how they form trajectories of violence. I applied three approaches typical for explaining group-targeted violence, as an interaction between state and society, a function of state capacity, and as performance of interethnic boundaries. Each has different implications for how popular violence is temporally linked to state violence. The case of medieval German antisemitic violence fits the description from the political mobilization literature that popular action elicits state reaction, as well as the story from political development that state capacities matter and the symbolic view that violence does boundary work. However, these each applied with unexpected caveats.

Popular violence led to state violence; pogroms preceded expulsions. In line with the main tenet of popular violence as mobilization, the sensitivity of government institutions to public sentiments translated into a violent state response. Similarly, the immediacy of authority, through direct governance, converted public antisemitism into state policy. State capacity did not constrain popular violence, as others have found. Indeed genocide was more common under governments with more direct authority and legal capacity. State capacity interacted with mobilization, in that genocide became more likely as more pogroms occurred where there were consulting institutions and higher administrative capacity. In partial support to the symbolic approach, Christians regularly victimized Jews, but not consistently with genocide. I did not find that religious organizations, the ideological source of the Christian-Jewish division, channeled popular violence into repeated ritual, though religious governance did provide some protection against state violence.

This study is an example of how rethinking concepts leads to reformulating theories. Similar to Barrie, Clarke, and Ketchley (2022) and Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017) I press us to disaggregate types of ethnic violence in order to better describe its patterns. While they were interested in disaggregating the targets and weapons of violence, I have disaggregated whether the perpetrators were part of some popular process versus the state. The consequence has been an analytical shift from the typical time-series data at regular intervals to data defined by the outcomes of interest, as in survival analysis. Such a logic is especially appropriate for historical studies and yet relatively unused. In particular for violence and for other collective actions that may follow "place-based political logics" (Nelson 2021), the intuitions of survival analysis are more aligned with valuing within-case sequencing, even though the results are ultimately between-cases.

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